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

Impact of Rival Cult Group Conflicts on Food Insecurity among Upland and Riverine Households in Selected Rural Areas of Rivers State

Authors
Piagbo, F. B., Otu, E. and Dinebari, B.
Department of Sociology, Faculty of Social Science, University of Port Harcourt, Nigeria

Corresponding Author
Piagbo, F. B.
(piagbo_felix@uniport.edu.ng)

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Abstract

This study examined the impact of rival cult group conflicts on food insecurity among upland and riverine households in selected rural areas of Rivers State. The persistent activities of rival cult groups in rural communities have disrupted farming, fishing, transportation, and local markets, thereby threatening household food access and availability. A sample size of 400 households was selected using a multistage sampling technique, covering both upland and riverine settlements. Data were collected through a structured questionnaire and analyzed using descriptive statistics and inferential methods. Findings revealed that frequent community disturbances related to rival cult groups significantly reduced farming time, limited access to farmlands and fishing zones, and increased the cost of transporting food commodities. Households in riverine communities reported stronger disruptions to fishing activities, while upland households experienced more restrictions in crop production. The study further found a significant relationship between the intensity of violent conflict and key food insecurity indicators such as reduced meal quantity, increased food prices, and reliance on less preferred foods. The study concludes that rival cult conflicts remain a major driver of food insecurity in rural Rivers State, affecting both production and distribution systems. It recommends strengthened community policing, improved youth engagement programs, and targeted food security interventions for communities most affected by recurring conflicts.

Keywords: Food Insecurity, Violent, Conflict, Cultism, Insecurity

Introduction

Food insecurity is a massive issue in Nigeria, particularly in the rural areas where most of the population depends on small farms. In recent times, societal stability and normal living have been disrupted by violent conflicts and low food supply in these societies. Most of the observed violent conflicts were associated with youth upheaval in the oil-producing society as well as land issues between communities in rural Rivers State and the Niger Delta in general. Such conflicts were the extensions of other issues within rural communities, such as the loss of collective land regulations, failure to support young people as it ought to be, and fractured community relationship within extended families. With conflicts continuing to be, people demand increased security. Megafarms were expensive and dangerous. Fears of being retaliated on leads to markets being turned into hide and seek which made everyday life a difficult experience.

Since food is an essential need to the humanity, it is an inherent need that is incorporated into the context of communities. Governments and international organizations are therefore interested in producing food, not to ensure that the human diet is fulfilled, but also to ensure that social order is upheld and conflict is mitigated. Deprivation of populations of

of adequate food often results in social instability and frustration as people strive to deal with the scarcity of resources. Such a loss of social trust and cohesion can foster a general feeling of hopelessness, particularly in underserved communities like rural communities (Olawuyi, 2019).

Regarding food production that takes place in an urban and rural environment in Nigeria, rural areas represent the major producers. As stated by Fanzo (2018), the central role in food production is played by rural households that represent the lower stratifications of the socioeconomic levels. Such households strive to achieve basic subsistence requirements and, at the same time, produce excess that can be used commercially and thus generate income to cater to their household needs. Market women then buy such produce and sell it in urban areas where there is great demand for food, thereby creating more revenue. It is a dynamic that makes the Nigerian socio-economic fabric stable because urban and rural populations enjoy the fruits of an inflow of farm products, which, in its turn, is possible mostly thanks to the contributions of rural residents. Therefore, any interference in the rural food production has negative impacts on the masses, and they find themselves in an economic setback. In addition, Matemilola (2017) also indicates that in Nigeria, the socio-economic pressure in urban centres is high, with prices of goods increasing and the spread of low-quality food materials. This city pressure, in its turn, strains the producers of rural areas, as they have to grapple with difficulties to make ends meet. The aggregate impact of the same denies rural residents the ability to fulfil basic monetary needs, which include education, health, housing and utility bills for their children.

Besides, the political intolerance contributed to 8.3 per cent of the conflict documented, which was further aggravated by the nature of competition inherent in the Nigerian multiparty system (Wilson & Osah, 2019). This is because unemployed and marginalised youth groups are often exploited by political actors and continue to keep promises unfulfilled relating to rural development and socio-economic transformation. This kind of manipulation creates political violence during and after election periods. Violence against competing cults was another 10.6 per cent of violence recorded, especially in places like Isiokpo, Omuike-Aluu, Mgbushimini-Rumueme, Elipradi-Emouha, Ipo, Egbeda, Rundele, Rumuiji, Omerelu, Omagwa and parts of the Ogoni region, including Khana and Gokana LGAs. The spread of cult groups, which usually argue over the territorial control, the political favour or the illegal economic benefits, has established violence as the normative component of these rural environments, therefore, disempowering the social cohesion and agricultural output.

Moreover, the land conflicts in the majority of the rural regions of the Niger Delta, where Rivers State is located, are highly embedded in complicated socio-cultural, economic, and political processes that go way beyond the trivial issues of farmland. From a social view, food insecurity is not an immediate or narrower technical issue, but tends to be an indication of underlying systemic failures touching on social harmony, land use and local governance. It is therefore urgent to further consider the role that continued violence and undermining of social functioning might have created in the disruption of food systems of rural populations, as can be demonstrated by the observed state of rising food insecurity in rural areas of Rivers State, Nigeria.

Materials and Methods

Olanrewaju and Balana (2023) aimed to demystify the complex consequences of violent unrest on food security in a country that was facing prolonged instability. At the core of their investigation was exploring the impacts of different occurrences of conflict, including insurgency in the northeast, and conflicts between pastoralists and farmers, as well as uncontrolled banditry, that have negative impacts on the nutritional diversity and access to food at the household level. Using a descriptive framework, the research utilised both primary data, gathered in the form of surveys to households living in conflict-ridden localities, as well as secondary sources in order to create a complex layer of analysis. The researchers did not fully present the details related to the number of individuals sampled and specific regional demographics; however, the purposive sampling method was adopted based on the severity of disturbances in various geopolitical regions, thereby including data on the heterogeneity of conflict severity. The methodological apparatus has mixed a structured questionnaire with a conflict event registry to enable the use of probit regression and a multiple regression model to unpack the empirical relationships, which are contained in the data. The results indicated a dark nexus where shocks related to conflict, such as loss of life, forcibly displaced, kidnapped individuals and even food shortage, significantly increased food insecurity indices. These shocks destabilised the agricultural production cycle, generated greater doubt and destabilised food variety in families, which essentially weakened the basis of rural sustenance. Further, the geographical mapping of conflict has shown different spatial patterns: an insurgent presence in the northeast, violent pastoralist-farmer conflicts that have been common in the central belt,

and conflicts over communal land that is clustered in the southern areas. The gender aspects also came into the limelight, where women were largely affected by food deprivation compared to their male counterparts. Based on their findings, the authors made specific policy prescriptions, which included peacebuilding models that are sensitive to regional realities, strengthened control of land tenure and livestock control, and strengthened investments that can support the resilience capabilities of rural households. These region-specific solutions were considered vital to the problem of the variegated character of conflict and its food security consequences. Although the study conducted by Olanrewaju and Balana is a critical move towards understanding the overall interaction between violent quarrels and food insecurity at the national level, its Generalist approach obscures the true ecological and demographic diversity in the rural masses. In contrast, the present study narrows down to a more fine-grained examination of the dissimilar effects caused by the specific types of violent instability, such as inter-communal conflicts, cult-induced violence, political intolerance, youth militancy in oil-producing enclaves and localised intra-group conflicts, on the food security performance of upland and riverine rural areas of a particular southern state. This localised attention offers a comparative cross-sectional study that separates the influences of discrete typologies of conflict on food access and food stability in divergent ecological settings.

The current investigation, in contrast to the synthesis of Olanrewaju and Balana, who summarise the conflict phenomena and regional consequences in broad, generalised categories, employs stratified sampling in a specific sample of administrative districts. It combines strictly designed surveys of the households with retrospective tracing of the incidents, which ensures the capturing of subtle community-based experiences and perceptions. This mixed paradigm design will allow descriptive and inferential statistical analysis, which will allow a strict disaggregation of vulnerability at the local level. Notably, these kinds of methodological rigour enable the identification of nuances that are often lost in more aggregate methodologies, such as local knowledge of the nature of conflicts and their direct impact on agricultural lives and diets. In a nutshell, even though the macro-level information provided in the antecedent study is important, our work puts the discussion on a more detailed level since it is within a fine-grained socio-ecological framework, and thus it adds more to the knowledge of how particular violent conflicts have differentially garnered food systems. This multilayered solution not only enhances the empirical base but also provides necessary directions towards developing context-specific policy and specific interventions that address the complexities of conflict-based food insecurity at the grassroots. One of the bright contributions of this study is that it tries to elucidate how the interaction between different typologies of conflicts and geographic seclusion forms the dimensions of food access, affordability, and dietary variety, which have hitherto received limited dedicated attention. The study will help create knowledge that is directly relevant to expropriated rural subpopulations that are habitually hidden in aggregated national records by making the gap between high-level policy frameworks and lived experiences more concrete. By so doing, a researcher undertakes a different path than generalised national surveys because it includes the spatial disaggregation of the survey in addition to the detailed categorisation of a conflict, which results in a more accurate assessment of food insecurity dynamics.

Contrary to this, John and Nwabueze (2022) examined the nexus of cult-related violence and food security in the Ekpeye ethnic group in Rivers State. Their research question was framed into three major research questions and objectives, and they used the conceptual framework of the Robert K. Merton theory of anomie. Using a survey model, a population of about 130,000 was surveyed, with a sample of 400 being calculated using the Taro Yamane formula. The respondents consisted of farmers, traditional leaders, traders and representatives of the youth, based on four purposively selected communities: Ogbologbolo, Ombor, Odiemudie, and Oyigba. To guarantee representativeness, the methods of multi-stage sampling were used, such as purposive, quota, and accidental sampling. A survey in the form of a structured questionnaire was used as the main data-collection tool, and the analysis was conducted using descriptive statistics, including charts, means, and standard deviations. The researchers identified that cult activities had a devastating impact on the production of agriculture, as they basically put farming activities in the region to a standstill. Moreover, cult group domination was found to be a major constraint to community building and the safety of farmers, which further increased food insecurity.

In the same manner, Nkpolu (2018) performed a descriptive survey research to identify the effects of cult operations on the socio-economic welfare of rural families in Western Rivers State, Orashi, Nigeria. This location was selected due to the fact that it is a hot spot in cult related insecurity in the Niger Delta during the years when the study was carried out. The entire population was all the adult males and females in the area, whereas purposive sampling was used to select a sample of 400 adult males

and 400 adult females in four local governments, namely, Ogba/Egbema/Ndoni, Ahoada East, Ahoada West, and Abua/Odual. The research results can be of significant contextual help to the investigations conducted on the implications of violent non-state actors on rural livelihoods and food security on a larger scale. The survey tool used in the research was known as the Impact of Cult Activities on the Socio-Economic Wellbeing of Households Living in Rural Areas. The instrument was subdivided into four parts, with each having a five-point Likert scale to represent different levels of agreement or perception. A subject-matter expert and lecturer of the Department of Vocational and Technology Education of Rivers State University, Port Sokon, performed face validation. In order to determine reliability, the researchers used the Cronbach's Alpha technique to determine internal consistency. A sample of ten male and ten female adults was randomly taken within Emohua Local Government Area in Rivers State in order to fill the instrument; the coefficient yielded was 0.77, which was an acceptable level in that it showed the reliability of the instrument in the study. The instrument was administered face-to-face and distributed and collected immediately. Data analysis was done through descriptive and inferential statistics. The research questions were answered by means and standard deviations, whereas hypotheses were tested by the use of -t-test with a 0.05 level of significance.

A descriptive survey research design was adopted in this study in the Riverine part of Rivers State. The state is further split into three senatorial districts, namely Rivers East, Rivers South-East and Rivers West, with twenty-three local government areas (LGAs) each. These LGAs consist of eight riverine districts, which are Akukutoro, Asaritoro, Bonny, Degema, Andoni, Opobo/Nkoro, Okrika and Eleme, and fifteen upland districts, including Ikwerre, Emohua, Port Harcourt, Obio/Akpor, Khana, Gokana, Tai, Eleme, Oyigbo, Etche, Omuma, Ahoada West, Ahoada East, Abua/Odual, and Ogba/Egbema/Ndoni. Being culturally diverse and democratically governed, Rivers State offers a highly dynamic social environment; nonetheless, violent conflicts, especially in village societies, have dramatically interfered with the social unity and economic well-being. These rural regions, which were already hit by the effects of the global challenges of the Nigerian economy, now experience sustainable food insecurity, although the state has a high agricultural potential. The target population was made up of 5,550,964 rural households in 1,060 settlements in Rivers state (Brinkhoff, 2022; Niger Delta Budget Monitoring Group, 2022). Table 1 shows the sample size according to the household in the riverine area.

Table 1:Proposed Sample Size Distribution of this Study in a Tabular Form using Multi-Stage Sampling Technique.

Rivers Senatorial Districts	**Selection of LGAs from Rivers State Dichotomy**		**Selection of 2 communities from each of the selected LGAs**	**Sample size of the Respondents**
Rivers East senatorial District	**Riverine**	Ogu/Bolo	Isaka	33 Rural Households
			Ogu	34 Rural Households
	Upland	Ikwerre	Aluu	33 Rural Households
			Igwuruta	33 Rural Households
Rivers South-East Senatorial District	**Riverine**	Andoni,	Aganna	34 Rural Households
			Aama-Runner	33 Rural Households
	Upland	Gokana	Lewe	34 Rural Households
			B-Dere	33 Rural Households
Rivers West Senatorial District	**Riverine**	Akukutoro,	Abonnema	33 Rural Households
			Obonoma	33 Rural Households
	Upland	Ogba, Egbema–Ndoni	Agah	33 Rural Households
			Akabuka	34 Rural Households
Total 3 Senatorial Districts	**6 Local Government Areas**		**12 Rural Communities**	**400 Rural Households**

Results and Discussion

The findings of Table 2 presented the mean and standard deviation values that assessed the perceived impacts of violent encounters between rival cult groups on food insecurity among rural upland and riverine households in Rivers State, Nigeria. The dataset included responses from 340 individuals, with 158 participants from upland rural households and 76 from riverine households, which provided valuable insights into how violent conflict affected food systems in these areas. The survey results showed that the frequency of fights occurring in communal farmlands, attributed to rival cult groups, had mean scores of 2.54 and 2.31 for upland and riverine respondents, respectively, resulting in an overall mean of 2.43—slightly below the critical mean value of 2.5. This indicated a lack of consensus among respondents regarding how frequently such violent encounters occurred. While there was recognition of conflict as a potential threat, perceptions of its regularity varied. In contrast, direct attacks on farms linked to cult-related violence received mean scores of 2.62 for upland households and 2.37 for riverine households, yielding an overall mean of exactly 2.50. This convergence reflected agreement among respondents on the existence and severity of such attacks. These violent incidents had significant consequences for food security and agricultural stability, disrupting farming activities and exacerbating food insecurity in the affected communities.

Regarding large-scale farm looting, upland respondents recorded a mean score of 2.48, while riverine respondents recorded 2.33, resulting in a combined mean of 2.41—below the criterion mean. This discrepancy reflected differing perceptions about the prevalence of farm pillaging, indicating that although the issue existed, it was not widely or uniformly experienced across communities. In other words, some households remained unaffected by such incidents. Economically, the study revealed significant consequences. For example, when assessing the higher costs of seedlings, upland households reported an average score of 2.63, and riverine households 2.48, yielding a combined mean of 2.56, which exceeded the criterion mean. This finding suggested a shared recognition of the financial burdens imposed by violent conflicts, as farmers faced inflated input prices that potentially hindered production and strained household budgets. Similarly, labour costs for agricultural activities increased in response to violence.

Table 2: Impact of Rival Cult Group Violent Conflicts on Food Insecurity across Study Area (n = 340)

S/N	Test Items – Rival cult group violent conflicts and food security	Upland Households (158)		Riverine Households (76)		Mean Set (2.5)	Decision
		Mean (2.5)	Sd	Mean (2.5)	Sd		
1	There are cases of confrontations between different cult groups in farmlands reported daily in this community	2.54	0.59	2.31	0.52	2.43	Disagreed
2	Farmers have experienced a series of attacks on their farms due to rival cult violent conflicts in this community.	2.62	0.62	2.37	0.54	2.50	Agreed
3	Most large farms have been constantly looted during different types of rival cult violent conflicts in this community	2.48	0.58	2.33	0.53	2.41	Disagreed
4	Farmers are now buying seedlings at an expensive rate to farm in this community as a result of rival cult violent conflicts.	2.63	0.62	2.48	0.58	2.56	Agreed
5	The cost of hiring labourers for farm work has increased due to rival cult violent conflicts in this community	2.72	0.65	2.40	0.55	2.56	Agreed
6	Most farming households are relocating from this community due to rival cult violent conflicts	2.59	0.61	2.46	0.57	2.53	Agreed
	Cluster Mean and Standard Deviation	2.51	0.55	2.39	0.55	**2.58**	

Upland households indicated an average of 2.72, and riverine households 2.40, resulting in a joint mean of 2.56, again above the criterion mean. This increase represented an expansion of farm expenses, adversely affecting households' productive capacity. Labour shortages further exacerbated these challenges, with many families struggling to secure necessary assistance during critical farming periods. Another notable finding concerned the increased consideration of relocation among rural households due to violent disruptions. Upland respondents had a mean of 2.59, while riverine respondents reported 2.46, producing a combined mean of 2.53, above the critical threshold. This suggested that community stability was being undermined, as families contemplated migration, potentially impacting agricultural productivity and long-term food security. Standard deviation (SD) scores indicated variability in respondents' views, with upland households showing an SD of 0.55 and riverine households 0.54. These variations highlighted differences in individual experiences and perceptions of conflict and farm looting within geographic categories. The impact of violence was therefore uneven, affecting households differently even within similar contexts.

The analytical findings presented in this segment highlight that cult-related hostilities have posed a tangible menace to agricultural stability and nutritional access in Rivers State, Nigeria. These hostilities have had disruptive repercussions on food production practices, which serve as the backbone of rural subsistence. Consistent with Joab-Peterside et al. (2021), the escalation of insecurity has functioned as a direct impediment to productive agricultural engagement, effectively cornering local cultivators into precarious economic positions. However, a puzzling pattern emerged, despite the ever-looming shadow of cult-related disturbances, numerous agrarian stakeholders did not perceive such volatility as an immediate daily threat. This observation hints at a phenomenon of normalised violence, wherein rural inhabitants, having lived through continual exposure, may have grown numb to the inherent dangers posed by cultist activities. As Ellison (2019) explains, in environments fraught with persistent unrest, food insecurity and socioeconomic instability become "the new normal," deeply entrenched in the rhythms of everyday survival. One notable inquiry line from the dataset examined the prevalence of agricultural asset looting.

Both upland and riverine rural constituencies reported divergent stances, indicating general disagreement on their frequency and impact. This divergence lent credence to the notion that while episodes of theft and property invasion did occur, their sporadic nature may not have reached the critical mass required to fundamentally destabilise agricultural outputs. Such scattered disruptions, while disruptive, may have failed to halt agricultural cycles entirely, thereby enabling some cultivators to press on with cautious optimism. Nkpolu (2018) posits that cultist intrusions do foster agronomic instability; nonetheless, the perception of such raids as infrequent could have softened their psychological and strategic impact on food cultivation systems. This aligns with Amare et al. (2025), who noted that variations in the perceived intensity of violent disturbances influenced farmers' investment behaviour; producers would adjust their operational scale based on how grave they judged the threat to be.

One assessed variable that stood out significantly was the escalating cost of seedlings, driven in part by the surrounding climate of conflict. Participants' feedback revealed that such inflated input expenses represented not just a monetary inconvenience, but a substantial economic bottleneck, one that hindered farming continuity. Babatunde-Lawal (2022) emphasised that political and cult-related violence acts as a major stumbling block to the realisation of food security objectives. These disturbances trigger supply chain dislocations and compel agricultural actors to reallocate funds toward security, diverting attention and capital from production-enhancing innovations.

Matemilola and Elegbede (2017) underscored the compound dilemma: soaring expenses paired with depreciating revenues yielded a volatile economic cocktail that curtailed the long-term viability of rural farming practices. Simply put, many producers found themselves caught between a rock and a hard place, unable to invest forward while struggling to maintain current output levels. Adding fuel to the fire, another data index in the evaluation spotlighted a surge in labour-related expenditures. Cult-associated violence had driven up the costs of hiring farmhands, largely due to heightened risk premiums. As Kingsley (2017) observed, the persistent presence of armed groups creates a work environment that is not only physically hazardous but also psychologically taxing, which translates into higher wage demands from labourers who brave these tense conditions. This scenario

mirrors the insights of Martin-Shields and Stojetz (2019), who maintained that food systems remain acutely vulnerable to sociopolitical conflict dynamics. When cost structures balloon, the margin for error in food production narrows dangerously.

The ripple effect of rising labour fees threatened to unbalance already fragile rural food networks, decreasing return on investment and reducing enthusiasm among producers to scale up operations. It's no stretch to say that such circumstances leave rural economies skating on thin ice. Further complicating matters, one inquiry line focused on relocation contemplation among rural agricultural stakeholders. A significant segment of respondents indicated that they had considered, or were actively planning, to abandon their agrarian ventures due to untenable living and working conditions. Such patterns of intended or actual outmigration underscore how deeply rival cult clashes have unsettled rural community life. Adongoi et al. (2017) documented similar migration patterns, noting that protracted conflict acts as a strong push factor, compelling individuals to seek refuge in safer locales.

The demographic drain caused by such outflows deprives the food production sector of necessary labour power, leading to a vicious cycle of reduced output and worsening food scarcity. However, pulling up stakes and relocating isn't as simple as packing a bag and leaving. Many agriculturists must weigh the heavy emotional and economic toll of severing ties with long-standing community networks. The social safety nets embedded in these local relationships are crucial for communal resilience, especially in times of crisis. Unfortunately, the inflow of less-integrated households into conflict-affected zones creates another layer of complexity. These newer entrants, often lacking deep roots in the community, may struggle to assimilate, thereby weakening the communal social fabric. As Chukwu (2016) rightly pointed out, the influx of external actors can ignite tension, compromise trust, and sow discord in already unstable environments, further aggravating existing vulnerabilities in rural food systems. Despite all this, one cannot ignore the role of community adaptation. In a twist of fate, the chronic nature of violence has led some cultivators to develop rudimentary coping strategies that allow them to persist under pressure, albeit in diminished form. These resilience mechanisms, while imperfect, are testimony to the human capacity to endure and improvise under duress. They provide a sliver of hope, showing that rural food production systems are not completely at the mercy of armed violence.

However, to count on resilience alone is akin to fixing a leaking roof during a rainstorm; it offers momentary relief but doesn't solve the structural problem. Further compounding the food security dilemma are issues of governance and socio-economic policy. Scholars like Adegbami and Adeoye (2021) emphasise that the consequences of cult-driven violence reverberate far beyond food shortages; they erode institutional trust, undermine policy effectiveness, and stall broader development trajectories. John and Nwabueze (2022) extend this analysis by examining how such forms of violence complicate the implementation of rural development programs, particularly those targeting food availability and access. Aryee et al. (2021) contribute by mapping out the societal costs of persistent conflict, noting that under such conditions, the goals of food sovereignty and nutritional security become difficult to attain, if not outright elusive.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Violent conflicts and food insecurity in select rural regions of Rivers State. It is apparent that the aspect of youth restiveness in the selected oil-bearing rural communities largely promotes the destabilisation of food production in such rural communities, hence exacerbating food insecurity. This tension that has existed as a result of the transgressions of the young, as well as the nooks and crannies of cult related violence, plays a direct role in creating an atmosphere of fear that goes directly against food security. Despite the successful activities of many respondents in the farming business, these violent dynamics, coupled with intra and inter-communal violent conflicts, linked issues like land disputes, aspects of chieftaincy conflicts, and issues of boundary conflicts disrupt the critical food production processes and cause complications in transport to open markets.

In light of the findings of this study, the following recommendations were made:

1. The Rivers State Government should establish Community Conflict Resolution Councils (CoCoRecs) in all three senatorial districts, ensuring balanced representation from both upland and riverine areas.
2. The Ministry of Youth Development (MoYD), in partnership with local non-governmental

organisations (NGOs), should implement Youth Reorientation and Empowerment Programs (YREPs) aimed at disenchanted youth in oil-producing and conflict-prone rural areas.

3. The Rivers State Ministry of Agriculture (RSMA), working in collaboration with the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC), should deploy Agricultural Security Support Teams (ASSTs) comprising middle-level graduates and fresh PhD holders in Social Sciences and Agriculture.

Declaration of Competing Interest

The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.

Credit Authorship Contribution Statement

Piagbo, F. B.: Conceptualization, Methodology, Formal analysis, Investigation, Resources, Data curation, Visualisation, Project administration, Writing - original draft, Review & Editing. **Otu, E.** and **Dinebari, B.**: Supervision, Methodology, Validation, Formal analysis, Data curation, Visualisation.

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